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Introduction
The main goal of this work is to present the issues connected with a new fi eld 
of interdisciplinary study – neurolaw. Neurolaw is an emerging fi eld that focuses 
on the potential for neuroscientifi c achievements to infl uence legal science. The 
structure of argumentation will be as follows: fi rstly, I will discuss some meta-
theoretical questions before presenting some of the practical and philosophical 
consequences of the applications of new science to legal reality. One of the goals 
of this work will be to demonstrate that changes in legal philosophy are strong-
ly connected with the practical side of legal science and, conversely, when we 
modify legal practice through neuroscientifi c achievements it has an impact on 
legal theory and philosophy. This is especially so when it comes to philosophical 
issues since it may change our understanding (or manner of interpretation) of 
basic legal principles. 
That is to say, this work is not a full description of the actual state of research 
in neurolaw. The purpose of it, and the real reason for writing this article, is to 
show the dimensions of changes in legal sciences thanks to the rapid develop-
ment of neuroscience. In other words, it is a presentation of the ways in which 
we can be a witness to the naturalization of normative science. We will start our 
analysis from a discussion of some meta-theoretical questions. 
The fi rst question concerns the need to seek information in natural science 
which can have a serious impact (or not) on the legal domain. Do we really need 
to seek answers in neurobiology? The other doubt is raised over the nature of 
legal concepts and, to be more specifi c, over the normative nature of legal con-
cepts. This is because the terms used in legal acts do not describe a certain part 
of social reality but are rather normative constructions, defi ning how the world 
should be organized and not describing how it really is. Everyone should remem-
ber that difference between the conceptual scheme of natural science and law 
when it comes to projects like neurolaw. Carelessly moving from natural science 
to law will effectively commit the naturalistic fallacy. 
The third meta-theoretical issue is a methodological one. Legal methodology 
has been a subject of constant debate for two thousand years, whereas neuro-
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biology took its fi rst steps “barely” one hundred and fi fty years ago.1 Moreover, 
relevant discoveries in neurobiology have only started to appear in the last two 
decades.2 This creates a situation of methodological instability since we do not 
know for sure how to interpret, and apply neuroscientifi c achievements in nor-
mative sciences, in particular, how we should proceed in the reinterpretation 
such fundamental legal concepts as: free will, the person, sense of justice, prop-
erty or normativity. In facing this problem, working out the correct methodology 
is one of the most urgent and basic challenges which faces anyone who wants 
to be a neurolawyer. The last meta-theoretical question concerns the credibility 
of neurobiological research. Is it really so accurate and precise that we can use 
them as a point of departure in our legal and philosophical investigations? 
For all these questions I will try to propose more or less satisfying answers in 
the next part of this work. 
Two perspectives
Putting in order the various strands of discussion in neurolaw’s domain is not 
an easy task. The large number of issues which we have to face, a multiplicity 
of problems and their systemic character are causes that we cannot change one 
concept in the legal conceptual scheme in isolation, changing one concept causes 
slight differences in understanding other concepts (for example, when we change 
the concept of declaration of intent we have to change the concept of legal capac-
ity, when we modify the second concept, our interpretations of the legal subject 
is going to change and so on). However, it seems that choosing one criterion over 
another or creating “the correct one” is a side issue. It is accepted in this work 
that the need for a division of discussion in neurolaw into philosophical and prac-
tical perspectives is only heuristic. Accepting it allows us to present in clear and 
precise manner the most important issues. In the literature we can meet other 
criteria which also play an accomplished role.3 
Neurolaw – from the philosophical point of view
We start our investigations in neurolaw by discussing a strongly theoretical 
problem, specifi cally, from an analysis of the concept of a “person,” which seems 
to be one of the most fundamental legal terms. The person has a long and com-
1  S. Zeki, O.R. Goodenough, Law and the Brain: Introduction, “Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B” 2004, vol. 359, p. 1662.
2  Ibidem, p. 1661.
3  Por. O. Jones, Law, Evolution and the Brain: Applications and Open Questions, “Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society B” 2004, vol. 359, pp. 1697–1707 and B. Garland, 
Neuroscience and the Law. Brain, Mind, and Scales of Justice, Dana Press NewYork/Washington 
D.C. 2004, p. 6.
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plex history with this term appearing not only in philosophy but also theology, 
bioethics, ethics and in law, and is also starting to appear in the natural scienc-
es4. The crucial question one should ask is what kind of function a person plays 
in law, or more broadly, in legal sciences? One answer was proposed by Stephen 
Morse in his article New Neuroscience, Old Problems. His answer is combined 
with another question, perhaps more interesting: how can neuroscience change 
our understanding of the “person” in law?
According to Morse, a “person” is a rational agent, capable of learning social 
rules of conduct and acting according to them. A person uses rules as premises 
in reasoning whether what one should or shouldn’t do:
Human action is distinguished from all other phenomena because only action is ex-
plained by reasons resulting from desires and beliefs, rather than simply by mecha-
nistic causes. Only human beings are fully intentional creatures. To ask why a person 
acted a certain way is to ask for reasons for action, not for reductionist biophysical, 
psychological, and sociological explanations (...). Only persons can deliberate about 
what action to perform and can determine their conduct by practical reason.5
A special accent is put on practical rationality, especially when it comes to 
discussing legal matters and the way in which law operates in a society:
(...) law operates through practical reason, even when we most habitually follow the 
legal rules. Law can directly and indirectly affect the world we inhabit only by its in-
fl uence on practical reason. For the law, then, a person is a practical reasoned.6
It can be seen that the defi nition of a person (and law) presupposes some 
version of rationality. Practical rationality is the key for understanding law and 
the “person” in Morse’s theory and is simply a feature of a subject who is able to 
understand premises (legal, moral, social rules) of conduct and act according to 
them. However, another feature of the subject can be traced. Discussion over the 
nature of a person, law, or legal subject is conducted in a Cartesian paradigm. 
This means that we accept a dualistic view of human nature and the world. 
On one side, we have biological processes, the mechanistic sphere where ev-
erything works automatically, where there is no place for choice, freedom or 
normativity and, on the other, we have a mysterious “it,” which means that we 
can deliberate over our acts, choose among them and asses what should be done. 
We are free agents. Our actions are not simply refl exes and we do not automati-
cally respond to external circumstances. We think and act because we are prac-
tically rational, we posses insight into practical reason, which is necessary for 
law (because legal sciences presupposes the existence of such a being). When we 
trace the structure of argumentation in Morse’s work, we see that when it comes 
to the person and its actions it isn’t: “the mechanistic outcome of mechanistic 
variables.”7 The author does not distinguish between a person and a human. In 
4  M. Arbib, Neuroscience and the Person: Scientifi c Perspectives on Divine Action (Scientifi c 
Perspectives on Divine Action Series) by Robert J. Russell et al. (Paperback – January 1, 2000).
5  S. Morse, New Neurosciences, Old Problems [in:] B. Garland, Neuroscience and the Law..., 
p. 160.
6  Ibidem, pp. 163–164.
7  S. Morse, op.cit., p. 164.
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fact, it seems that he regards the two notions as being identical. Every human is 
a person, because every human can think rationally. 
What is particularly interesting from our point of view is the second question 
that Morse asks: “How can neuroscience infl uence our understanding of a per-
son?” To sum up, a person is a free, rational subject, not simply a machine who 
responds to the changing circumstances of the external world. The concept of 
a person is strongly connected with other concepts like: freedom, reason, will 
etc. So when neurosciences appears on horizon there is the possibility that in the 
process of naturalizing a person we can – in the end – notice that we have in fact 
annihilated the concept, and we can only think about humans in mechanistic, 
biological terms. This is the biggest risk for law, ethics or even all normative 
science. The Cartesian paradigm that Morse accepts forces him to argue in this 
dualistic manner. This paradigm in our case takes the form of a dualistic view of 
human beings: in humans we have minds and brains, which are somehow differ-
ent and separated from each other. Naturalizing the mind is a danger for persons 
because when it succeeds there will be no people, only a biological (mechanistic) 
explanation of humans. The result of such a strategy will be a change in our 
fundamental intuitions about the person understood as a rational, free-choosing 
agent and, in the end, we will have to change our basic intuitions about law. 
However, Morse concludes that there is no considerable risk that neuroscience 
can, so soon at this point of its development, naturalize personhood. As a result, 
we can speak of a person as it was understood so far. 
To sum up, an advantage of this kind of reasoning is mostly that, it brings 
attention to the concept of the subject in legal science, and also it concerns an 
essential problem – how can neuroscience infl uence the concept of person, and 
therefore on the legal system. However, it should be conducted with a higher 
dose of precision and more carefully than Morse did so since Morse’s argument 
is fl awed. Firstly, his defi nition of a person is arbitrary accepted. He doesn’t ex-
plain why he uses this defi nition and why not another one. In fact, perhaps he 
does not speak about the person at all? The way in which he argues for his point 
reveals the author’s attachments for a dualistic picture of the world, a kind of 
Cartesian paradigm. It is of course acceptable to accept in one’s work a dualistic 
ontology, on condition that one explains why it is necessary but Morse does not 
do so. Secondly, as we have seen before, the naturalization of normative sciences 
is a naturalization of different sort, than this proposed by Morse. In our case, be-
tween neuroscience and law, lies philosophy and philosophical arguments. Lack 
of it will, as we have seen in Morse’s argumentation, cause further problems. 
Nevertheless, there is another way in which we can analyze a person understood 
as a fundamental legal concept. 
First of all, law presupposes a certain anthropological thesis and this thesis 
is crucial for the picture of the human which is present in legal sciences. It de-
scribes, for example, the ways in which humans make decisions, or fi nd them-
selves in one or another legally relevant situation. During the process of careful 
analysis we will be able to extract from legal rules, doctrines and sentences a set 
of anthropological theses and then use them to construct a picture of the hu-
man which is presupposed in law. It has to be pointed out that “a picture” of the 
human in law cannot be equated with a defi nition of a human being. The main 
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difference is that a picture is not a complete description of what humans are. 
The picture contains only a characteristic of humans to the extent which it is 
relevant to law. When this picture is reconstructed we can start to wonder how 
it can be modifi ed by achievements of neurosciences. Being more precise, we can 
see how a picture of the human in legal sciences can be actualized by the picture 
of the human present in neuroscience. At this point, after the actualization of 
the picture of the human in law, we should check how this change will affect fun-
damental legal institutions or the conceptual framework of law. The next step 
we can take is to propose a slight change of the interpretation of legal concepts 
(when necessary), for example, a concept of the person in private law and also 
the concepts connected with it. In this manner, changes to the anthropological 
thesis in law can be a cause of change in the person in law.  
As we have seen, modifying one term will perhaps make a difference in un-
derstating other terms in the conceptual framework, because the conceptual 
scheme of law is a complex net of connections between many different notions. 
When we change one, for example a person, we should revisit such terms as dec-
larations of intent, legal capacity etc. At the end of this process we can actually 
face a situation where we started with modifi cation of legal notions, and end up 
with a modifi cation of the ways in which we apply legal rules.
Normative judgments
The next issue which has been lively discussed in the literature is the prob-
lem of normative judgments. At fi rst glance, it seems to be only a theoretical 
problem. Normative judgment happens when a subject declares – generally 
speaking – how one should or shouldn’t proceed. Nevertheless, we need a clearer 
and precise defi nition of normative judgment:
For our own usage, we like the term ‘normative judgment’ as an inclusive description 
of the many fl avours humans fi nd among those things that ought to be done and those 
that ought not to be done, particularly in the social context of interaction with other 
humans. In this sense, normative judgment fi rst involves the construction of a system 
(or systems) of norms, values and expectations, and, second, the evaluation of the ac-
tions of another agent, or of our own actions, made with respect to these norms, values 
and expectations.8
From the philosophical point of view, the question of the nature of normative 
judgment is essentially important. The accepted conception of normative judg-
ment introduces a limitation on the defi nition of ethics or law. Understanding 
how people make normative judgments also has an infl uence on the concept of 
the subject in legal sciences. So, as we can see, the answer for the question: 
“what is the nature of normative judgment?” is very important from a philo-
sophical point of view.
8  O.R. Goodenough, K. Prehn, op.cit., p. 1710.
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Philosophers have since time immemorial, we can say without exaggeration, 
been concerned with the source of normative judgements. They still search for 
what is responsible for making a judgment – emotions, reason or maybe some-
thing else? For the purposes of this work, we assume that two main positions in 
philosophy can be pointed out and a set of variations between them. The fi rst 
gives priority to reason and the second claims that emotions are the source of 
normative judgment. The fi rst is represented by Immanuel Kant, who thought 
that only reason is responsible for declaring what is right and what is wrong. 
The second is usually ascribed to David Hume, according to whom emotions were 
considered as the most important ingredients of this kind of judgment. These po-
sitions were irreducible to one other and we did not posses a criterion for resolv-
ing which philosophical position is the correct one. The situation changed when, 
in neuroscience, researchers started to investigate which part of our brains are 
active when we resolve moral dilemmas or legal cases. Initial research showed 
that neither Hume nor Kant were right, and the truth about source of normative 
judgment lies between them. 
We are privileged – by contrast with Hume and Kant – because we have 
more data than they did at their disposal and thus we are not compelled to only 
observe and speculate about the source of normativity. Natural science, and in 
this case – neuroscience, provides us with more data than those philosophers 
possessed in their times. However, despite this lack and using purely speculative 
methods, they were not completely wrong in answering the question: is norma-
tive judgment a domain of reason or a domain of emotions? 
Today, we are able to ask this question again and try to answer it, but from 
a new perspective. Firstly, we shouldn’t think about normative judgment as 
a strictly rational activity. This observation, or rather an interpretation of neu-
roscientifi c information, was the main cause for proposing an answer that emo-
tions play a crucial role and reason is only a tool which actualizes itself after 
judgment and its role is to create justifi cations ex post for our choices. This “so-
cial intuitionist model,”9 however, also seems to be inconsistent with neuroscien-
tifi c achievements. In light of the latest research a normative judgment is:
The totality of the evidence suggests that normative judgment consists of one or more 
sets of higher mental abilities, which in turn rely on a variety of disparate cognitive 
and affective processes, such as understanding of a situation, appraising its emotional 
valence, activating norms from long-term memory, maintaining a norm in working 
memory, comparing the norm with the present behavior, and deciding if there is any 
transgression, all of which take place under the infl uence of emotional processes. 
Therefore the neural basis of normative judgment is likely to involve several brain 
systems and to be distributed across the large portions of the brain. That said, it is 
also possible that there may be dedicated elements – perhaps even primitives – for 
certain aspects of the process.10
This brief description is called a consensual model, because it reconciles the 
Kantian and Humean propositions. In this case reason and emotions are consti-
9  J. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment, “Psychological Review” 2001, vol. 108, pp. 814–834.
10  O.R. Goodenough, K. Prehn, op.cit., p. 1717.
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tutive elements of it. Nevertheless, the consensual model isn’t the fi nal answer 
which neuroscience can provide. This is because there is a third, more mysteri-
ous element of judgment, namely intuition. For example, we can think about ev-
eryday judgments about how one should do something, and we are not emotion-
ally involved in it nor do we take time to make fully rational decisions. Moreover, 
a situation can easily be imagined when we don’t think about a correct way of 
proceeding and yet we do something correctly. A good example of this kind of 
situation is when we drive a car. We are not emotionally involved when we are 
doing this, neither do we take time to think it through carefully. The consensual 
model then tries to tie together reason, emotions and intuition. As a conclusion, 
it can be said that the old, philosophical paradigm “reason-emotion” is no longer 
a good point of departure when it comes to revealing the “real” nature of norma-
tive judgment.
Presently, the goal of research in neurobiology is focused on the identifi cation 
of brain areas connected – or more precisely, brain areas which can be inter-
preted as those which can possibly be linked – with a certain kind of judgment. 
Particularly interesting is the possibility of a demarcation between moral and le-
gal judgments. Goodenough and Prehn11 claim that setting a boundary between 
law and morality can be possible from the neurobiological point of view. Research 
shows that during judging, where premises are literally expressed legal rules, 
brain areas usually responsible for deductive reasoning are active. On the other 
hand, when the premises of our reasoning are not expressed in legal enactments 
or are expressed in any other way we don’t “think” rationally. In this case, brain 
areas are active which are usually connected with emotional processing. This 
observation – while of course interesting – fails to settle an argument between 
those who think that law and morality are essentially different, and those who 
think that law and morality make the same normative system of rules. Further 
research has to be done in order to provide a more precise answer, but the pros-
pects are very promising.
Also interesting seems to be research which is devoted to measuring the neu-
rological activity of professional lawyers and people who are not involved in legal 
practices. The activity was measured during the resolution of legal cases and 
moral dilemmas. Researchers tried to fi nd answers to three questions:
1) Are there any differences in brain activity when resolving “hard” and 
“easy” cases?
2) Does the neurobiological process which stands behind decision making the 
same in legal professionals and legal laymen?
3) Is there any difference – from the neuroscientifi c point of view – between 
resolving normative dilemmas and any other?
At fi rst glance it seems that deliberations over whether normative judgment 
is fundamentally rational or emotional are purely theoretical – interesting but 
theoretical. However, in fact it can be used in practice. For example, research 
conducted on judges of the fi rst and second instance supplied very interesting 
results. The brain area activated when judges passed a sentence were different 
in judges of the fi rst instance than in the case of judges of the second instance. In 
11  Ibidem, p. 1719.
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the case of adjudicating in the fi rst instance, brain areas which were activated 
were similar to those which are responsible for decision making in cases like 
footbridge type dilemma. It means that emotional reasoning plays a greater role 
in the fi rst instance court. Judges in trial court are of course rational, however, 
the role of neurobiological processes which stands behind a fi rst instance deci-
sion has a major infl uence on it. It can be concluded that sentences in trial court 
are not as objectively rational as they could be. On the other hand, in the case 
of judges of the second instance, brain areas activated are similar to those acti-
vated in the case of people resolving moral dilemmas like trolley type dilemma. 
As a result, the research came to the conclusion that judges in appeal court are 
more rational because their relations with parties are less personal. Therefore, 
their sentences are more objective and fair because judges themselves are obtain 
a higher degree of rationality.
These results can bring very exciting consequences for the process of apply-
ing law. Firstly, we can formulate rules of a good trial – the more impersonal 
relations between parties and judges, the more rational and objective will be 
a sentence. When a sentence will be more rational, then – automatically – will 
be fairer. 
This is only one example of how neuroscience can enrich our theoretical 
knowledge about law and thus have an impact on legal practice. We can fl uently 
move from theoretical deliberations to practical ones and vice versa. Therefore, it 
is hard to think of neurolaw in an non-systemic manner. Changes in theory are 
very important from a practical perspective, and – as we will see in the next part 
– changes in legal practice are also important from the theoretical perspective. 
Neurolaw from a practical point of view
We can start our investigations from another side, namely we can go straight 
to the practical side of legal science. Instead of analyzing legal concepts in light 
of neuroscientifi c achievements, and then proposing new ways of interpretation, 
we start now from legal practice, and we are going to analyze if technologies used 
in neuroscience can be helpful for legal problems. 
In fact, they can be and they are. A good example of such a strategy are 
neuroscience based lie detectors: infrared lie detection, thermal imaging, fMRI 
and so called “brain fi ngerprinting.”12 The fi rst one measures blood pressure in 
a brain.13 We don’t need to describe technical details but it suffi ces to mention 
that slight changes of blood pressure in brain areas connected with cheating can 
be interpreted as an indication that a certain person lies. The second technique 
is thermal imagining. This is based on the observation that a lying person emits 
more heat in eye areas than a person who is honest. However, these methods 
are not – strictly speaking – revolutionary. The situation changed when fMRI 
12  www.brainwavescience.com; “Neuroscience and The Law”, p. 109 ff.
13  R. James, Brainwave Monitoring Becomes Ultimate Lie Detectors, “SciScoop: Exploring 
Tomorrow”, January 6, 2003.
133NEUROLAW. A NEW PARADIGM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
was fi rst used in order to detect if a person tells the truth or lies. Dr Daniel 
Langleben made an experiment using fMRI and concluded that when people 
are lying, their ACC (anterior cingulate cortex) and SFG (superior frontal gyrus) 
automatically light up. In the case of honest people, their ACC and SFG are not 
activated so much. In fact, when people tell the truth, another brain area lights 
up – the temporal lobe. Of course, we do not know for sure that the ACC is re-
sponsible for cheating because it is also responsible for, for example, resolving 
cognitive confl icts.14 Therefore, using fMRI in spite of its promising results is still 
not the ultimate technique for lies detecting. 
The most technologically developed lies detector is so called “brain fi nger-
printing.” It measures the electrical activity along the scalp produced by the 
fi ring of neurons within the brain. What it is important from our point of view is 
that we can use this technique to say if someone has contact with a brand new 
stimulus. It can be very useful as a tool for interrogation since, for example, we 
can present a stimulus that it is known only to the police and an offender, and 
if the brain tells the person had prior contact with this particular stimulus then 
she committed a crime.
 To this day, brain fi ngerprinting was used several times in legal proceed-
ings. The most spectacular use of it took place in T. Harrington’s case. He was 
released after serving twenty four years in prison for murder. L. Farwell demon-
strated in the courtroom that an electrical pattern of the brain of T. Harrington 
was inconsistent with the pattern of person who really committed this crime. 
Judge allowed the use of proof from brain fi ngerprinting because it was consis-
tent with Daubert’ standard. 
As we have seen, neuroscience is already present in courtrooms. Brain fi n-
gerprinting is the best example of this tendency, which in time will be getting 
stronger – it could be used to assess the credibility of witnesses, or even parties. 
Yet there is another side to this coin: Can we test a person with BF without her 
consent? Or how we should assess the testimony of a witness who refused to take 
a test with BF? I think that using BF can have potentially huge consequences 
for legal principles like the presumption of innocence. It’s fascinating how the 
modifi cations of legal practice can infl uence legal theory. 
Summary
By way of a conclusion, we will try to answer a few meta-theoretical questions 
which we asked at the beginning of this work. Firstly, lawyers really don’t have 
to make use of neuroscientifi c achievements, the law works fi ne without them. 
Lawyers, of course, needn’t be biologists. However, as we have seen, the applica-
tion of new science can bring us benefi ts: we will be able to fi nally understand the 
process of decision making which is so important for a legal system, we will know 
14  D. Langleben, L. Schroeder, J. Maldijan et al., Brain Activity during Simulated Decep-
tion: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, “Neuroimage” 2002, vol. 15, pp. 
727–732.
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more about humans as understood as a subject of legal rules, we will have at our 
disposal brand new tools (neuroscience based lie detectors) which can improve 
legal proceedings by making them more scientifi c. Secondly, the legal system is 
a set of normative concepts and neuroscience provides us only with descriptive 
ones. Yet, as we have seen, the legal system presupposes an anthropological the-
sis and when we actualize it with neuroscientifi c knowledge we avoid commit-
ting the naturalistic fallacy. This means it is possible to change normative legal 
concepts through the use of descriptive neuroscientifi c arguments. Therefore, we 
can still use science to resolve legal issues and it is without question a consider-
able advantage that neurolaw enjoys over other interdisciplinary studies of law. 
